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The Uniform Arbitration Act*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is an overview of recent court decisions that interpret state versions
of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A.").' Arbitration statutes patterned after the
U.A.A. have been adopted by thirty-four states and the District of Columbia. The
goal of this project is to promote uniformity in the interpretation of the U.A.A. by
articulating the underlying policies and rationales of recent court decisions
interpreting the U.A.A?
II. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In determining whether or not there exists a valid arbitration agreement, it must
first be established that the parties actually agreed to be bound by such an agreement.
If it is found that such an agreement exists, the court must then determine the scope
of that agreement.
A. Determination of the Existence of an Agreement to Arbitrate
Courts are reluctant to invalidate an express arbitration agreement due to alleged
contractual flaws. In Knaffl v. Douglas Co.,4 Knaffl entered into a contract with The
Douglas Company ("Douglas") to provide certain painting services as a
subcontractor. 5 Knaffl subsequently filed a materialman's lien and brought suit
against defendant6 seeking payment for his services. Douglas claimed that Knaffl's
work and materials fell short of the specifications as set forth in the contract and filed
a "motion to dismiss or for summary judgement, and an alternative motion for order
* This project was prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution Candidates under the direction of
Associate Editor in Chief Jeffrey B. Williams.
1. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
2. Jurisdictions that have adopted arbitration statutes based on the U.A.A. include: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
3. This Article surveys cases decided between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 1999.
4. No. 03A01-9901-CH-00006, 1999 WL 894203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id. The owner of the property at issue, a trustee on the deed of trust, and two insurance companies
as sureties were also named as defendants. Id.
7. Id. at *1.
1
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to arbitration."' Douglas' motion to dismiss or for summary judgement was granted
and the motion to compel arbitration was overruled. 9 After Knaffl's motion for
amended judgement, both of Douglas' motions were denied pursuant to invalidation
of the contract's venue selection clause, mandating that arbitration be conducted in
Toledo, Ohio.'0 Douglas subsequently appealed the chancellor's denial of the
motion to compel arbitration." On appeal Knaffl argued that the arbitration
agreement should be void due to a lack of consideration. Because Douglas
possessed a unilateral right to invoke arbitration under the agreement, Knaffl claimed
that there was a "lack of mutuality."" The Tennessee Court of Appeals disagreed
and stated that "a contractual obligation to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator
is sufficient consideration to support an arbitration agreement."' 3 Pursuant to this
finding, the court vacated the trial court's order denying Douglas' motion to compel
arbitration but declared the venue selection clause as void under Tennessee law. 14
Similarly, in following the proposition provided in the U.A.A. that a "written
agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration ... is valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract,'" the court in M. Swentor v. G. Swentor16 stated that a
unilateral mistake by one party, believing that an agreement was not truly binding,
is not sufficient grounds to set aside an arbitration agreement. 7 In this case, a
property distribution established through arbitration pursuant to a divorce action was
set aside due to the wife's belief that the family court would make the final decision
as to the results of the agreement.'" The South Carolina Court of Appeals stated that
even though the family court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether or not
the parties had agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, the Arbitration Act
precluded the family court from reviewing the substantive fairness of the
agreement. "
In addition to common law contractual formalities, additional formalities may
be imposed by state adoption of the U.A.A. In Mueller v. Howard,2" Mueller,
employee, brought suit against Howard, employer, alleging breach of contract,
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and corporate dissolution.2' Howard moved
to dismiss all claims "alleging that the parties expressly agreed that any disputes
under the agreement would be settled by arbitration."2 2 The motion to dismiss was
8. Id. at *2.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *2 (Plaintiff's authority for invalidation of venue selection clause was TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-11-208 (1993)). id.
11. Knaffel, 1999 WL 894203 at *2.
12. Id. at *3.
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id.
15. U.A.A. § 1.
16. 520 S.E.2d 330 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
17. Id. at 337-38.
18. Id. at 331.
19. Id. at 332-39.
20. 5 S.W.3d 182 (Mo. App. 1999).
21. Id. at 185.
22. Id.
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denied.23 Howard appealed the trial court's decision, alleging that the arbitration
clause was enforceable.24 Mueller claimed that the arbitration clause was not
enforceable due to lack of notice proscribed in the Missouri version of the Uniform
Arbitration Act. 5 The Missouri court of Appeals, Eastern District found that the
agreement between the parties affected commerce and was thus subject to the
Federal Arbitration Act ("F.A.A."). 26 Based on this finding, the court further stated
that the F.A.A. preempts state arbitration acts and additional burdens proscribed by
state acts will not defeat an arbitration clause which is otherwise valid under the
F.A.A.27 Therefore, the notice proscribed in Missouri Revised Statute § 435.460 was
not necessary because the agreement at hand was covered by the F.A.A.28
Even though courts appear reluctant to negate an express arbitration agreement,
decisions concerning arbitration agreements allegedly arising from implication or
construction are not so uniformly enforced. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Triple H Electric Co.,29 the Arkansas Court of Appeals decided that an
agreement to arbitrate cannot arise by implication.0 In this case, United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company claimed that an arbitration agreement in an earlier
contract between the two parties implied an agreement to arbitrate subsequent similar
issues." The court stated that an implication that agreements to arbitrate would be
binding in regard to subsequent contracts between parties would undermine the
requirement that a party has to expressly agree, in writing, to arbitrate certain
disputes before they can be bound by that agreement.32
However, in a similar case before the Colorado District Court, it was decided
that the course of conduct of the parties was enough to establish a binding contract,
including an arbitration agreement, even in the absence of a signature by either
party.33 Here, the course of conduct between the contractor and homeowners,
whereby homeowners authorized an architect to solicit bids and homeowners
accepted contractor's offer through the architect, was held to have established a
binding contract including the arbitration agreement contained in the general
conditions in the standard bid package sent by the architect to the contractor.34
Previous conduct leading to an arbitration agreement was emphasized in Board
of Education of the Appoquinimink School District v. Appoquinimink Education
Ass 'n.35 The primary dispute in this case concerned a provision contained in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the school district and the education
association stating that disability insurance would be provided in the amount of 66
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 186 (citing. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (1994)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 187.
28. Id. at 186.
29. No. CA99-245, 1999 WL 1031264 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1999).
30. Id.
31. Id. at *2.
32. Id. at *3.
33. Todd Habermann Constr. Inc. v. Epstein, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172-73 (D. Colo. 1999).
34. Id. at 1173.
35. No. CIV. A. 16812, 1999 WL 826492 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1999).
2000]
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2/3% of the employee's salary.36 A disagreement as to whether the percentage of the
employee's salary should be in addition to or include other sources of income was
submitted to an arbitrator who decided that the proper interpretation of this clause
was that the percentage of salary paid by the insurance is in addition to other
sources."7 Subsequent to the arbitrator's decision, negotiations between the parties
resulted in changing the clause at issue to read that the percentage of the employee's
salary paid by insurance would include other sources of income.3" The school
district decided that the modified provision would be applied retroactively and
reduced insurance payments accordingly. 39 On behalf of the aggrieved employees,
the association sought arbitration of the issue of whether or not the modification
should be applied retroactively. 4° The school district argued that it was not obligated
to comply because the retired employees were no longer "employees" as defined by
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.4' The court stated that even though the
Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act did not apply, the broad language of the
arbitration agreement within the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by
the school district and the education association, coupled with the school district's
previous course of performance was sufficient evidence of the parties' intent to
submit to arbitration "claims concerning workers who retire as a result of
disability.
' 42
Although courts generally require a valid, written agreement to arbitrate
disputes, they seem reluctant to invalidate such agreements due to lack of equal
bargaining power between the parties. In Brown v. Karemor International, Inc., 3
the court stated that an arbitration agreement does not compel arbitration of disputes
unrelated to such agreement and that an agreement procured by fraud can be
rescinded without seeking arbitration." The court further stated that the standardized
form contract containing the arbitration agreement might be classified as an adhesion
contract; however, this alone does not render the contract unenforceable.45
"Enforceability generally depends upon whether the terms of the contract are beyond
the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or
unconscionable. 46  Applying this concept, the court stated that whether an
arbitration provision buried on the reverse side of the contract requiring disputes to
be arbitrated in Carson City, Nevada, is reasonable was a valid issue and remanded
the case to the Chancery Court for further proceedings.47
Likewise, in Rembert v. Ryan 's Family Steak Houses, Inc.,48 where an employee
brought an action against a former employer claiming race and handicap
36. Id. at *1.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *2.
39. Id. at *3.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *10.
43. No. 01A01-9807-CH-00368, 1999 WL 221799 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1999).
44. Id. at *2.
45. Id. at *3.
46. Id. (citing Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn. 1996).
47. Brown, 1999 WL 221799 at 3.
48. 596 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
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discrimination, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that a pre-dispute agreement
to submit statutory employment discrimination claims to arbitration does not render
a contract unenforceable as an adhesion contract provided that the agreement does
not waive statutory rights, is procedurally fair, and the terms of the agreement are
reasonable or the employee had a "meaningful choice." '49 The court also noted that
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are invalid if the statute itself prohibits such
claims. However, this was not at issue in this case since neither the Civil Rights Act
nor the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act prohibit such agreements. 0
Additionally, even if the court finds that a valid agreement to arbitrate does
exist, the existence of such an agreement does not necessarily bind all parties
involved in a particular dispute. In Hetrick v. Friedman, D.P.M,5' the court stated
that a party cannot be compelled to submit an issue to arbitration unless they have
previously agreed to do so." In this case, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, ("BCBS") a
health insurer, intervened as a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action "asserting a
contractual lien against any judgement or settlement for reimbursement of benefits
it paid under an insurance policy."53 Even though plaintiffs Carolyn and Frank
Hetrick had agreed to submit their malpractice claims to arbitration, the agreement
was not binding to BCBS because they had not previously agreed to the same. 4
Rather than holding the arbitration agreement to be invalid, the Court simply stated
that the original parties to the agreement were still bound by the agreement, but
parties outside of the agreement were not.
55
Even in the absence of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate, the issue of
arbitrability may arise when parties subsequently agree to arbitrate their disputes.
In the case of Dahl v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,56 the employee-appellant claimed that he
was wrongfully discharged and brought suit against employer-respondent under the
Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act §§ 39-2-901-915 and alleged
that he was discharged due to respondent's desire to avoid paying his fringe
benefits.Y Subsequently, both parties agreed to submit the claim to arbitration and
selected an arbitrator.5" Respondent then moved to dismiss arbitration "on the basis
that because the complaint alleged a motive for Respondent to discharge Appellant,
the complaint was intended to state a cause of action under federal law, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 100 1-1461 ."9
The arbitrator dismissed the arbitration and respondent moved for confirmation of
the arbitrator's decision.' The district court confirmed the arbitrator's decision.6 1
Respondent challenged the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award, even
49. Id. at 226.
50. Id. at 226-27.
51. 602 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
52. Id. at 605.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 605-06.
56. 993 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1999).
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though he failed to object to the award before the arbitrator or the district court.62
The Supreme, Court of Montana stated that when a question of arbitrability arises,
resolution is a matter of determination by the arbitrator. 63 Therefore, "by failing to
move for an order vacating the award... [the appellant] waived its right to object
to confirmation of the arbitration award."'
B. Determination of the Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
Once it has been found that a valid arbitration agreement does indeed exist, the
courts must then decide the scope of that agreement. Furthermore, they must
distinguish between claims that the parties have agreed to arbitrate and those which
were intended to be settled judicially.
In Frizzell Construction Co. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C.,6 5 the chancery court withheld
claims of fraudulent inducement from arbitration because Tennessee law did not
permit arbitration of claims of fraud.6 This dispute arose out of a contract between
Gatlinburg L.L.C. ("Gatlinburg") and Frizzell Construction Company ("Frizzell")
for the construction of a hotel.67 Subsequent to a dispute regarding payments under
the contract, Frizzell filed a "Complaint to Enforce Mechanic's Lien and for Breach
of Contract., 68 In response, Gatlinburg argued that the contract was "fraudulently
induced through Frizzell's misrepresentation of its expertise and ability to complete
the project for the stated amount."69 Frizzell argued that since the contract involved
interstate commerce, the F.A.A. mandated that all disputes be submitted to
arbitration.7 ° On the issue of arbitrability, the chancellor held that the contract did
not "involve interstate commerce so as to bring the contract under the F.A.A."7' The
Supreme Court of Tennessee held that since several of the participants in the project,
including employees, contractors, vendors, banks, and a corporation insuring the
project were from out of state, the contract did involve interstate conunerce and thus,
the F.A.A. is applicable.72 However, the court also found that the contract evidences
that the parties intended to resolve claims of fraudulent inducement judicially. 3
Similarly, in Midomo Co. v. Presbyterian Housing Development Co.,
74
landowner Midomo brought suit against the Presbyterian Housing Development
Company claiming fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation in conjuncture with
a breach of contract claim regarding a proposed personal care facility. 75 The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that for an agreement to come within the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id.
65. 9 S.W.3d 79 (Tenn. 1999).
66. Id. at 81.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 82.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 83-84.
73. Id. at 84-85.
74. 739 A.2d 180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
75. Id. at 183.
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scope of the U.A.A., the "agreement must be in writing," and the "agreement must
expressly provide for arbitration under the act.,7 6 The court then found that the
agreement did not expressly cover tort claims, thus, claims of fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation were not covered under the agreement."' In deciding
the arbitrability of tort claims, the Court of Appeals of Texas stated that when there
is a valid arbitration agreement, the tort claims fall within the scope of the agreement
except when "the alleged tort is so completely independent of the contract as to be
actionable without reference to the contract., 78 In this case, BPA Fabrication, Inc.
("BPA") claimed that Jamak Fabrication, Inc. ("Jamak") had breached the asset-
purchase and raw-materials-purchasing portions of a contract between the parties,
alleging fraud and interference with contract claims "and claims that Jamak violated
the Texas DTPA.,,79 BPA initially sought arbitration of these issues under the
dispute resolution clause of the contract, but, subsequently demanded declaratory
relief alleging that these claims were not covered by the agreement."0 Jamak moved
to compel arbitration of all claims." The court affirmed arbitration of these issues
on the grounds that "[these claims] are neither independent of that contract, nor
maintainable without reference to that contract.
8 2
However, in Ryan, MD. v. Kontrick, MD.,3 the Illinois Court of Appeals stated
that parties are only obligated to arbitrate "those issues by clear language that they
have agreed to arbitrate," and that arbitration agreements will not be extended by
implication to encompass issues arising outside of the scope of the express
provisions.84 Thus, the court found that since the arbitration agreement did not
expressly authorize arbitrator to make punitive damage awards, the arbitration
agreement "cannot be extended by construction or implication" to encompass such
awards. 5
In the situation where an arbitration agreement is executed in connection with
a business entity, determination of the scope of such an agreement may require
additional consideration. In Chazen v. Parton,8 6 former shareholders of the Knox
Metals Corporation filed suit claiming fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against
Chazen, a former officer and stockholder.7 Chazen's motion to compel arbitration
of the dispute pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in the Stock Purchase
Agreement was denied by the trial court on the ground that "the dispute between the
plaintiffs and Chazen did not arise out of or relate to the Stock Purchase
Agreement." 8  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama stated that the
76. Id.
77. Id. at 190.
78. BPA Fabrication, Inc. v. JamakFabrication. Inc., No. 01-98-00765-CV, 1999 WL 977819, at *5
(Tex. App. Oct. 28, 1999).
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *5.
83. 710 N.E.2d 11 (111. Ct. App. 1999).
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 14.
86. 739 So.2d 1104 (Ala. 1999).
87. Id. at 1105.
88. Id. at 1106.
2000]
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applicability of an arbitration agreement between parties is to be determined by
general principles of state contract law.8 9 Applying the aforementioned concept in
conjuncture with the principle of lex loci contractus, 90 the court decided that under
Tennessee law the arbitration agreement at issue only encompassed disputes between
the "shareholders" and the "purchaser," not disputes among the shareholders
themselves. 9' However, in addressing a similar issue, the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari,92 stated that a limited
liability company is bound by the arbitration clause contained in the Limited
Liability Company Agreement. The court found that since it is the members of the
company who "are the real parties in interest," derivative claims brought against the
company will be subject to the arbitration clause even though the agreement was not
executed by the company but signed by the members. 93
III. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
Section 2 of the U.A.A. deals with motions to compel or stay arbitration.94 The
party seeking to arbitrate must show an agreement, as provided in section 1 of the
U.A.A., existed between the parties.95 Upon motion to stay an arbitration, the court
looks for the absence of an agreement to arbitrate the issue between the parties.96
A. Arbitration Agreements Between Contractors and Subcontractors
Arbitration clauses can not be implied into agreements because of prior dealings
between two parties. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triple H Electric
Co.,97 Triple H Electric Co. ("Triple H"), a subcontractor, sued Structural Systems,
Inc. ("SSI"), the general contractor, and U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("USF&G"),
the surety, for money owed on a project in Fort Smith, Arkansas.9" SSI and USF&G
responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration.99 The trial court denied this
motion and SSI and USF&G brought this appeal.'"
Triple H did the electric work for SSI on the construction of a Lowe's Home
Improvement Center in Fort Smith, Arkansas.' Triple H encountered difficulty
during this project and did not wish to bid on any future SSI projects, but SSI
encouraged Triple H by assuring them that they "would have at least sixty days 'on
89. Id.
90. Id. Lex loci contractus provides for application of the law of the jurisdiction where the contract
was executed. Id.
91. Id. at 1108.
92. 727 A.2d 286 (Del.1999).
93. Id. at 292-93.
94. U.A.A. § 2.
95. Id. § 2 (a).
96. Id. § 2 (b).
97. 1999 WL 1031264.
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the slab,' i.e., working from a concrete slab rather than the more troublesome and
less efficient rock-base subfloor."' 2 Based upon this assurance, Triple H submitted
bids for two future SSI projects.'0 3 On July 27, 1995, SSI issued construction
schedules for the two projects."° Upon review of the construction schedules, Triple
H determined that it would not have the sixty days of "slab time" that it was
assured."3 Triple H then informed SSI that it would not complete the projects for
the amount bid.1° SSI replied that if Triple H did not perform, SSI would complete
the work and bill any additional costs to Triple H. 1 7 One month later, Triple H
sought payment for the work done on the Fort Smith project plus costs due to
delays.' 8 SSI refused to pay and claimed that Triple H owed SSI money for
additional costs on the two new projects."
Triple H brought suit in court, but SSI moved to compel arbitration based upon
the contract from the Fort Smith project."0 Triple H admitted that the Fort Smith
claim was arbitrable, but denied that the claims on the two new projects were subject
to arbitration."' The circuit court agreed with Triple H, stating that "no contracts
existed between SSI and Triple H on the Shawnee and Muskogee jobs nor did the
parties make any agreements to arbitrate."" 2
On appeal, SSI argued that Triple H signed a standard subcontract form in prior
dealings with SSI that contained an arbitration clause, and therefore, Triple H
impliedly agreed to arbitration on disputes arising from the two new contracts."3
The court of appeals pointed out that the previously signed arbitration clause
specifically stated that it only applies to disputes relating to "this contract.""' 4 The
court went on to rule that arbitration clauses can not be "incorporated into separate
agreements by implication alone.""''
In Knaffl v. Douglas Co. n 6, Knaffl, a painting subcontractor, sued the Douglas
Company, the contractor, for payment on work done at an apartment complex." 7
The Douglas Company, claiming that Knaffl did not perform the contract as signed,
moved for summary judgement or alternatively to compel arbitration."' The
chancellor initially denied the motion for arbitration and granted the motion for
summary judgement, but due to a venue selection clause, later denied both












113. Id. at *2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 1999 WL 894203.
117. Id.
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before them to determine was the motion to compel arbitration. 20 Knaffi asserted
two arguments: "(1) the arbitration clause was void for lack of consideration, and (2)
the arbitration clause was void because it violated Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-11-
208....2 The court of appeals quickly brushed aside the first argument by reasoning
that agreeing to be bound by an arbitrator's decision was sufficient consideration.'2 2
The court of appeals also dismissed the second argument by finding that the adoption
of the Uniform Arbitration Act shows a legislative policy favoring arbitration.
2 1
The court then concluded that the contract between the parties, "while still
complying with Tenn. Code Ann. section 66-11-208," required arbitration. 24
D. Wilson Construction Co. v. Cris Equipment Co.,125 is a case of a contractor
suing a subcontractor for indemnification. 26 Wilson completed a construction
project for the McAllen Independent School District in Texas. 127 The McAllen
School District then brought a suit to compel arbitration against Wilson for using
deficient fill dirt and was awarded a settlement of $2,150,000.'28 Wilson then sought
to arbitrate for indemnification against Cris Equipment Co., Inc. ("Cris"), the
subcontractor responsible for the fill dirt.' 29 Cris requested voluntary mediation, but
an agreement could not be met and an arbitration hearing was set for March 3,
1997.30 In the meantime, Cris filed a petition in Harris County seeking declaratory
judgment, restraining order and to enjoin arbitration. 3 ' The case was voluntarily
transferred to Hidalgo County where Wilson responded by filing a plea for
abatement and a motion to compel arbitration.12 The trial court denied the plea and
the motion. 3 3 As a result, Wilson filed an interlocutory appeal and petition for writ
of mandamus. "
The appellate court first determined that the TGAA, the Texas version of the
U.A.A.," , was the controlling law in the case. 36 Wilson asserted five arguments on
appeal:
(1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration and
in failing to abate Chris's suit pending arbitration, (2) the trial court erred
in failing to hold that the arbitrator, rather than the trial court, decides the
issue of timeliness, (3) that if the trial court decides timeliness, Wilson's
arbitration demand was timely, (4) the trial court erred in considering the
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id.
125. 988 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App. 1999).
126. Id. at 391.
127. Id.
128. Id.






135. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 171.002 to 171.020 (West 1999).
136. Id.
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merits of Wilson's claims or Chris's alleged defenses as grounds to avoid
arbitration, and (5) Cris was estopped from questioning timeliness in the
trial court on the eve of the final arbitration hearing.'
' 37
Cris responded by arguing:
(1) under the applicable version of the TGAA, Wilson has no right to
arbitration because Wilson is not a non-profit entity, (2) Texas trial courts
do decide if conditions precedent have been satisfied when considering
whether to compel arbitration, (3) according to the terms of the contract
documents, Wilson's arbitration demand was barred by limitations, and
(4) Cris has not relinquished its right to have a trial court declare if
arbitration rights exist. 3 '
The appellate court first decided to use the 1997 version of the TGAA reasoning
that no substantial differences existed between the earlier versions and the most
current version. 39 The court next moved on to Cris's argument that the TGAA only
applies to non-profit organizations. 140  Looking at the probable intention of
legislature, coupled with the fact that Texas adopted the U.A.A., "which is not
limited to non-profit corporations," the court concluded that the TGAA applies to for
profit organizations. 4' The appellate court then moved on to the issue of who
determines whether or not an arbitration demand is timely.142 The court found that
the trial court may determine if the breach of a condition precedent bars the right to
compel arbitration. 43 The appellate court then determined that Wilson was not
barred from compelling arbitration because of the terms specifically set out in the
contract between Wilson and Cris.'" The appellate court concluded that the trial
court erred in denying Wilson's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case
to the trial court.
45
In United States of America ex rel. Tanner v. Daco Construction, Inc,, " the
United States District Court of Northern Oklahoma ruled on a dispute involving the
Miller Act.' 47 In this case, Tanner, a subcontractor, brought suit against Daco
Construction, Inc. ("Daco"), a general contractor, for payment due on survey work
on a project.44 Daco sought to compel arbitration and Tanner countered by claiming
that part of the dispute involved the Miller Act, 49 which he believed could not be
arbitrated and the other part of the dispute should not be severed because all the
137. Id. at 392-93.
138. Id. at 393.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 394.
141. Id. at 394-95.
142. Id. at 395.
143. Id.
144. d. at 396-97.
145. Id. at 398.
146. 38 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (N.D. Okla. 1999).
147. Id. at 1300 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 270).
148. Id.
149. 40 U.S.C. § 270.
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issues arose from the same facts. 5 ° The court found that Miller Act claims were
arbitrable, but in this case the agreement between the parties did not cover arbitration
of Miller Act claims. 5 ' However, the court found that the underlying issue in
dispute was arbitrable and that the court was required to compel arbitration of that
issue even if "the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate
proceedings in different forums."' 5 2 The court concluded that the underlying issues
were to be arbitrated, but that the Miller Act Claims were open to litigation."'
B. Motions to Compel Arbitration as Applied to Employer Employee
Relationships
In Correll v. Distinctive Dental Services, P.A.,"" the issue was whether or not
a claim brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA")'" precluded
arbitration.' Correll, a dentist, was fired from Distinctive Dental because his wife
worked at a competing dental office within seven miles of Distinctive Dental in
violation of an anti-competition clause in Correll's contract. ' 7 Correll claimed that
this was marital status discrimination in violation of the MHRA."'5 Distinctive
Dental moved to compel arbitration, but the circuit court ruled that the MHRA
precluded arbitration.'59
The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed this question and attempted to
"harmonize the MHRA and the MUAA." '60 The court of appeals came to the
conclusion that the MHRA does not void the contractual agreement to arbitrate.' 6'
The court reasoned that precluding arbitration in this case would interfere with the
parties ability to freely contract. 62 The court also discussed the probable intention
of the legislature not to override contracts and the strong policy in Minnesota
favoring arbitration.'63 The appellate court concluded that the district court erred in
judgement and ordered the parties to submit to arbitration.'"
In Towles, v. United Healthcare Corp.,'65 Towles, a doctor, sued his former
employer, United Healthcare Corporation ("UHC"), after being dismissed.' 66 UHC
moved to compel arbitration, but was denied by the circuit court resulting in this
appeal. The Appellate Court of South Carolina found three issues to determine: "1.)
Whether the FAA applies, 2.) whether United and Towles formed a valid and
150. Id. at 1301.
151. Id. at 1301-02.
152. Id. at 1303-04 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985)).
153. Id. at 1306.
154. 594 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
155. Minn. Stat. §§ 363.01 -363.20 (1998).
156. Correll, 594 N.W.2d at 224.
157. Id. at 223.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 225.
161. Id. at 227.
162. Id. at 225.
163. Id. at 225-26.
164. Id. at 227.
165. 524 S.E.2d 839 (S.C. Ct. App.1999).
166. Id. at 842.
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binding arbitration agreement, and 3.) whether the agreement covers Towles'
claims."' 67 The court found that the F.A.A. did apply, because interstate commerce
was involved. 68 The court then found that an arbitration agreement was formed
because Towles signed an agreement to follow the rules in his employee
handbook. 69 Last, the court found that the agreement did cover Towles' claims and
that if there was any doubt as to the scope of arbitrability it should be resolved in




Mueller v. Hopkins & Howard, P.C. 7 2 also involved an employee suing his
former employer. 73  Mueller brought suit against Hopkins & Howard, P.C.
("Hopkins & Howard") and Hopkins & Howard moved to have the case dismissed
citing an arbitration agreement in its contract with Mueller. 74 The trial court
dismissed the motion and this appeal was brought.17 The only issue on appeal is
whether or not Mueller's action should be dismissed and arbitration compelled.'
7 6
The appellate court found that the motion to dismiss was sufficient to be considered
a request to compel arbitration.'" The appellate court then applied the F.A.A. to the
contract.77 Looking at the contract between Mueller and Hopkins & Howard, the
appellate court concluded that the trial court erred and that the parties should be
compelled to enter into arbitration.
179
C. Judicial Review of Arbitrability
In Southern California Edison Co. v. Peabody Western Coal Co.,'8s the Supreme
Court of Arizona was asked to decide whether an order compelling arbitration was
subject to review."' The trial court ordered arbitration following a motion by
Peabody Western Coal Co. ("Peabody") and the court of appeals dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction finding that the order to compel arbitration "was
interlocutory, and therefore, nonappealable under Roeder v. Huish."'82 Southern
California Edison Co. ("the Utilities") then filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court of Arizona.'
The court in Roeder held that an order to compel arbitration is appealable only
after the confirmation of the arbitration award is sought and not prior to the
167. Id. at 843.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 844-5.
170. Id. at 846.
171. Id. at 847.
172. 5 S.W.3d 182.




177. Id. at 186.
178. Idat 186-87.
179. Id. at 188.
180. 977 P.2d 769 (Ariz. 1999).
181. Id. at 770.
182. Id. at 771 (citing Roeder v. Huish, 467 P.2d 902 (Ariz. 1970)).
183. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 977 P.2d at 771.
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arbitration.'8 The Utilities argued that it is illogical to go through a lengthy
arbitration process before resolving whether the issue was arbitrable in the first
place." 5 The Supreme Court of Arizona admitted that this issue has pros and cons
on each side, but upheld the appellate court's decision. 8 6 The court reasoned that
allowing appeals from orders to compel arbitration, "would destroy the benefits of
arbitration as a speedy, efficient, and inexpensive method of dispute resolution."'87
The court also pointed out, "that the law favors arbitration of disputes that the parties
have agreed to arbitrate."' The court then looked to the U.A.A. and F.A.A. which
both state that only orders denying arbitration are appealable.' 9 The court did
recommend an avenue for appeal in the conclusion.'" The court suggested that a
party can "request that the trial judge enter a final order or judgement under Rule
54(b) or A.R.S. section 12-2101."9' The aforementioned ruling is appealable and
if the judge refuses to make such a ruling that decision can be challenged on a
special action.'92
In Board of Education of the Appoquinimink School District v. Appoquinimink
Education Ass 'n, 93 the Court of Chancery of Delaware was faced with a motion to
compel arbitration filed by the Appoquinimink Education Association
("Association").'" The court found that the only issue was arbitrability of the
grievance at issue.'9' The court found that although the DUAA,'9 the Delaware
version of the U.A.A., did not apply, it did provide guidance. 97 The court ruled that
the issue of arbitrability was one for the court to determine, not the arbitrator.'9 In
order to determine the arbitrability of the issue the court looked at both the contract
and prior conduct between the parties.'9 The court determined that the dispute was
arbitrable due to the language of the contract and a prior arbitration between the
parties in 1996.2°
184. Roeder, 467 P.2d at 904.
185. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 977 P.2d at 771.
186. Id. at 773.
187. Id. at 772.
188. Id. at 773.
189. Id. at 774.
190. Id. at 776.
191. Id.(citing ARiz. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2000)).
192. Id.
193. 1999 WL 826492.
194. Id. at *1.
195. Id. at *4.
196. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 5701-5725 (1999).
197. Id.
198. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 826492 at *5.
199. Id. at 08.
200. Id. at*10.
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D. Compelling Arbitration Based on the Scope of the Arbitration
Agreement
In BPA Fabrication, Inc. v. Jamak Fabrication, Inc.,2 ' BPA Fabrication, Inc.
("BPA") appealed an order to compel arbitration. 2 2 BPA argued that the under the
Texas Act,203 as applied to arbitration, the parties at hand were not subject to
arbitration and that the issue arbitrated was not under the scope of the arbitration
agreement.20 The court of appeals first addressed the issue concerning the Texas
Act where BPA claimed that the Texas Act limited arbitration to nonprofit
organizations.2 5 The court, however, rejected this argument citing holdings in
previous cases including Wilson Construction Co. v. Chris Equipment Co., which
was discussed in section A of this article.2°  The court also stated that the Texas Act
was adopted from the U.A.A. and the U.A.A. applied to for profit organizations. 2 7
Next, the court looked at the scope of the arbitration agreement to determine if
the issue in the case was arbitrable.08 The court applied the F.A.A. test of "whether
the extra-contractual claims are factually intertwined with the contract claims," and
the Texas Act test of, "whether the alleged tort is so completely independent of the
contract as to be actionable without reference to the contract.' ,209 After reviewing
these tests the court upheld the motion to compel arbitration.210
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania assessed whether or not an arbitration
agreement covered tort claims in Midomo Co., Inc. v. Presbyterian Housing
Development Co.211 Midomo Co., Inc. ("Midomo") brought a six part suit against
Presbyterian Housing Development Co. ("PHDC") alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation, nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract
contingency clause.2"2 Midomo also filed for interference with contract, breach of
oral contract, and breach of contract implied in fact against Presbyterian Homes, Inc
(PHI).213 PHDC and PHI claimed that all six counts were subject to arbitration due
to the contract between the parties or the fact that the issues arose out of the contract
between the parties.2 4 The court stated that arbitration was a matter of contract and
looked at the four comers of the agreement between the parties to determine the
issue of arbitrability. 25 The court found that the counts based in tort and the counts
against PHI were all outside of the scope of arbitrability laid out in the contract.""
201. 1999 WL 977819.
202. Id. at *1.
203. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 171.002 to 171.020.
204. BPA Fabrication, 1999 WL 977819 at *4-5.




209. Id. at *5.
210. Id.
211. 739 A.2d 180.
212. Id. at 186.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 187-90.
216. Id. at 190.
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The court did find that the third count, breach of the contract contingency clause,
was subject to arbitration due to the contract between the parties and ordered that
count to be settled in arbitration.2"
In Comdisco, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.,218 the appellate court reviewed a
motion to compel arbitration and the actual scope of the arbitration. 2' 9 The issue in
this case arose pursuant to an arbitration contract between Comdisco and Dun &
Bradstreet. 2°0 Comdisco terminated a lease with Dun & Bradstreet which triggered
an "early termination value" provision in the original contract between the parties. 22'
This provision required Comdisco to pay the "fair market value" of the equipment
leased from Dun & Bradstreet. 22 2 The parties could not agree to what the "fair
market value" was, so an arbitration agreement was entered.223 A dispute over the
arbitration agreement then ensued and Dun & Bradstreet filed a motion to compel
arbitration with the court. 4 The original trial court denied the motion to compel
arbitration. 225 Dun & Bradstreet appealed and the appellate court reversed and
remanded to the trial court.226 The trial court then ruled in favor of arbitration and
added that all disputes over "fair market value" were within the scope of the
arbitration. 227
The case came before the appellate court for a second time on appeal from
Comdisco. 228 The court found that arbitration should be compelled and the only
issue was the trial court's interpretation of the scope of the arbitration agreement. 229
Comdisco argued that some of the issues in dispute were outside of the scope of the
arbitration agreement.Y° The court found that if the contract was clear then the court
could define the scope of the arbitration agreement, but if the contract was
ambiguous then the scope of the arbitration agreement was to be determined by the
arbitrator.2' After review of the contract the appellate court found it to be
ambiguous and left the scope of the arbitration to be determined by the arbitrator.232
IV.. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS
Under section 7 of the U.A.A., an arbitrator, much like a regular judge, may: (1)
issue subpoenas for witnesses and production of various documents, (2) set terms
217. Id. at 191.
218. 713 N.E.2d 698 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999).
219. Id.









229. Id. at 701-2.
230. Id. at 701.
231. Id. at 701-02.
232. Id. at 703.
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and conditions that allow depositions to be taken of witnesses who cannot be
subpoenaed or are unable to attend the hearing, (3) compel a person under subpoena
to testify, and (4) require fees for attendance as a witness equivalent to a court of
law.
233
It is within the arbitrator's power to refuse to allow discovery depositions.234 In
Barry v. Telander,23' the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator did not
exceed his powers by preventing the plaintiff from deposing the defendant doctor or
other hospital personnel. 36 Plaintiff Barry sued Dr. Telander for negligence, battery
and breach of contract. 3 7 After disagreement over whether to arbitrate or place the
matter on the trial calendar, Dr. Telander moved to compel arbitration. 23' To
develop a punitive damages claim, Barry then sought to depose the defendant and
hospital nurses.239 The arbitrator granted Dr. Telander's motion for a protective
order to prevent the depositions.2 " On appeal, Barry argued, without explanation,
that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by issuing the protective order.24' The court
found that the U.A.A. did not compel the arbitrator to allow the discovery
depositions.242
V. SECTION 9: CHANGE OF AWARD BY ARBITRATORS
Section 9 of the U.A.A. explains the process of applying to change or to clarify
an arbitration award.243 Any applications for the change of an award must be made
within twenty days after the delivery of the award and written notice must be sent
to the opposing party stating that any objections must be made within ten days.2"
In Fradella v. Petricca,245 the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, looked at the
issue of whether or not ministerial corrections to arbitration awards tolled the time
limitation on applications to change arbitration awards.246 On December 18, 1997,
Fradella was ordered to pay Petricca $25,000 in compensatory damages following
an arbitration hearing.247 However, the arbitration forms mistakenly stated that the
decision was made in accordance with Massachusetts law instead of New York
law.24 The error was corrected on February 23, 1998, but the arbitral award was still
233. U.A.A. § 7.
234. Id.









243. U.A.A. § 9.
244. Id.
245. 183 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1999).
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dated December 18, 1997.249 Fradella's counsel requested that the arbitration award
be dated as to the correction on February 23, but this request was denied and the
award was recorded as of December 18, 1997.250
On March 25, 1998, Fradella moved to vacate the award and Petricca responded
by filing for dismissal based upon the fact that the motion to vacate was seven days
late.25 ' The district court ruled for Petricca and Fradella brought this appeal.252
Fradella argued that the February 23rd amendment to the award was substantial and
should change the date of finality.253 The appellate court upheld the district court's
decision and listed several reasons for doing so.2- First, the only issue at
controversy was unambiguously decided on December 18, 1997.255 Second, if
ministerial problems with arbitration awards tolled the limitations period then a
clever party could preclude the running of the period indefinitely by asserting some
form of error. 2 6 Last, it would defeat the purpose of arbitration, to expediously
resolve disputes, to allow small errors to impede the finality of decisions.257
VI. SECTION 10: FEES AND EXPENSES OF ARBITRATION
While it seems to be fairly well settled that most of the fees and expenses of
arbitration may be awarded according to the arbitrator's discretion, in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, this does not necessarily encompass the award of
attorney's fees.
In Camelot Investments, LLC v. LANDesign, LLC,25 Camelot Investments, LLC
("Camelot"), "the developer of a residential subdivision," brought suit against
LANDesign, LLC ("LANDesign") alleging defective work in regard to
LANDesign's planning and engineering services. 259 LANDesign moved to compel
arbitration based on an arbitration agreement contained in an addendum to the
parties' original contract. 21 In response, "Camelot argued that none of the
documents concerning design services included an arbitration clause. '26 The trial
court found that the execution of the addendum indicated that the parties had
intended to apply its provisions to the entire contract and subsequently dismissed the
complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction.262 Upon LANDesign's motion








256. Id. at 20.
257. Id.
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of $5,165.75.263 Camelot argued that since the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, "it also lacked jurisdiction to award attorney's fees.,, 264 The Colorado
Court of Appeals stated that the U.A.A. provides that while the arbitrator's expenses
and fees and other such expenses of arbitration are appropriately awarded by the
arbitrator, attorney's fees, unless specifically agreed to within the arbitration
agreement, are not. 265 The court then decided that the references to "arbitration" and
"litigation" within the provision dealing with attorney fees allowed a fair reading that
attorney's fees could be recovered, by court order, whether or not they were a
product of arbitration or litigation. 266 However, the court did not find that the
language of the agreement expressly authorized an arbitrator to award attorney's
fees. 267 Thus, the court found that the court ordered award of attorney's fees was not
in err "and its order is not void for lack of jurisdiction., 268 The court further stated
that pursuant to its reading of the agreement, attorney's fees could reasonably be
interpreted to encompass appellate attorney fees and the issue was remanded to the
trial court to determine reasonableness of an award.269
Similarly, in Compton v. Lemon Ranches, LTD.,270 the Colorado Court of
Appeals decided that under the U.A.A., absent an agreement to the contrary, an
arbitrator is not allowed to award attorney's fees but is allowed to award other costs
and fees "incurred in the arbitration. 2 71 In this case, defendants, Lemon Ranches
LTD., entered into a "Settlement Stipulation" with plaintiffs, Thomas L. and Patricia
Ann Compton, in order to resolve a partnership dispute and replevin action.272
Pursuant to the stipulation, the parties submitted their dispute to binding arbitration
with the trial court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the arbitration.273
Additionally, the trial court entered an order that "(e)ach side shall pay its own
attorney fees and costs," and also provided that the arbitrator would decide the
"ultimate responsibility for the arbitration fee. 274  Prior to entering a final
judgement, the arbitrator requested information from both parties as to their attorney
fees and costs.2 75 In response to an award favoring defendants and awarding attorney
fees of $8,006.51, plaintiffs moved to vacate and/or modify the award as to both the
substantive portions and the award of attorney fees. 276 The court of appeals found
that since the original stipulation did not allow for attorney fees, the only basis for
the award of such fees would have been a subsequent agreement between the parties




266. Id. at 1281.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1280.
270. 972 P.2d 1078 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
271. Id. at 1079-1080.





277. Id. at 1080.
2000]
19
Griffin et al.: Griffin: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Based upon this finding, the court determined that the parties' conduct of providing
the arbitrator with the requested information as to attorney fees and costs, did not
constitute an agreement that the arbitrator would be allowed to award such fees.278In Marathon Oil Co. v. Arco Alaska, Inc.,2' 9 Marathon Oil Company
("Marathon") entered into an arbitration agreement with Arco Alaska, Inc. ("Arco")
regarding a dispute as to whether or not Marathon had the right to terminate an
agreement whereby Marathon supplied gas to Arco and as to the price of gas
delivered.280 Subsequent to the arbitrator's final decision, Marathon moved that the
superior court either modify or vacate the award.2"' The superior court denied
Marathon's motion and then granted Arco's request for attorney's fee incurred in
defending the arbitrator's decision.282 On appeal, Marathon argued that the superior
court erred in regard to its award of attorney's fees as well as its refusal to modify
the arbitrator's decision.28 3 As to the claim of err or in regard to the award of
attorney's fees, the Supreme Court of Alaska decided that the placement of the
requirement that each party bear its own costs and fees within a paragraph dealing
solely with arbitration did not preclude the award of costs and fees in an action to
vacate the arbitration award.2 Further, the court stated that the U.A.A. provides that
superior courts may award attorney's costs and fees "to the prevailing party in an
action to affirm or modify an arbitration agreement.,
28 5
VII. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Section 11 of the U.A.A. states that, "the Court shall confirm an award, unless
within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or
modifying or correcting the award., 28 6 In the case of modification or correction the
court is to look at sections 12 and 13 of the U.A.A.287
A. Confirmation ofArbitration Awards
In Policeman 's Benevolent Ass 'n, Local 292 v. Borough of North Haledon,288
the Supreme Court of New Jersey was asked to determine if a party can seek
confirmation of an arbitration award after a statutory time limit had run.2 8 9 The
Policeman's Benevolent Association ("PBA") was involved in an arbitration with the
Borough of North Haledon ("the Borough") in which the arbitrator ruled in favor of
278. Id.
279. 972 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1999).
280. Id. at 598.
281. Id. at 599.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 599-600.
284. Id. at 603.
285. Id.
286. U.A.A. § 11.
287. Id.
288. 730 A.2d 320 (N.J. 1999).
289. Id. at 322.
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the PBA.2'9 The New Jersey version of the U.A.A. sets a time limitation of three
months after the delivery of the award for confirmation or vacation of the award.29
After the arbitration award, the PBA waited four months and then filed for
confirmation in the chancery court.2 9 The Borough responded two months later by
filing for vacation of the award.293 The chancery court confirmed the award and
barred the Borough's counterclaim as untimely. 294 The dispute then moved to the
appellate division where both sides motions were ruled as untimely.2 95
Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court looked into the matter of time
limitations as applied to the confirmation and vacation of arbitration awards.2" The
court construed the New Jersey arbitration statute as applying to summary actions
to confrm awards only.2" The court suggested that an action could still be brought
at common law to conf-mr the award.2 9 The court made this decision by applying
the F.A.A. which limits summary confirmation actions to one year, but has no time
limit on common law confirmation actions. 299 The court also took into account
policy considerations, finding that, "[d]epriving the parties of common-law
confirmation would consign them to a legal limbo." 3" Denying the parties the
ability to confirm the award would put them back in the same position before the
arbitration, defeating the whole purpose of the process.0 1 However, the court went
on to say that if parties do wish to be confined to a certain time limit then they
should set that time limit out in their contract.30 2 The court remanded the issue to the
chancery court to rule on the confirmation." 3
The Appellate Court of Illinois examined the confirmation of arbitration awards
in Everen Securities, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.3" Everen Securities, Inc.
("Everen") and A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc. ("A.G. Edwards") arbitrated a dispute
over two employees leaving Everen for A.G. Edwards and allegedly breaching
fiduciary duties and misappropriating trade secrets in the process.305 The arbitrator
ruled for Everen and Everen commenced this action to confirm the award, but A.G.
Edwards responded by filing a counter suit asking for vacation of the award based
upon the theory that the arbitration panel exceeded their scope of authority."
The appellate court began their review of the decision by pointing out that
review of an arbitration award is limited and the arbitration is to be upheld whenever
290. Id.
291. Id. at 322.
292. Id. at 322.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 323.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 324-25.
298. Id. at 325.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 326.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 719 N.E.2d 312 (111. Ct. App. 1999).
305. Id. at 315.
306. Id. at 315-16.
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possible.3° The appellate court looked at the transcripts from the arbitration hearing
to make their determination because the panel did not provide any rationale with its
decision.30S A.G. Edwards' main complaint was that the arbitrators committed a
gross error of law by allowing the testimony of a witness by Everen.3 9 A.G.
Edwards, however, failed to rebut the testimony of Everen's witness at the
arbitration.31 A gross error of law is required to overcome the appellate court's
standard of review over the trial court of abuse of discretion in this case.3 ' The
appellate court concluded that without rebuttal of Everen's witness there is no proof
that the arbitrators committed a gross error of law and the award should be
confirmed.312
The Texas Court of Appeals, First Circuit, started their analysis of BPA
Fabrication, Inc. v. Jamak Fabrication, Inc.313 similarly to the Illinois Appellate
Court by stating that every reasonable presumption is given in favor of the
arbitration award. 14 In this case, Jamak Fabrication, Inc. ("Jamak") sought to
confirm an arbitration award and BPA Fabrication, Inc. ("BPA") sought to have the
award vacated based on the premise that one of the arbitrators was partial. 's This
claim by BPA was based on the fact that Jamak owned machinery purchased from
a company that one of the arbitrators represented as an attorney." 6 The appellate
court dismissed this claim finding that a business relationship does not automatically
disqualify an arbitrator and BPA presented no evidence of actual bias at the
arbitration,317
In Scheidly v. Travelers Insurance Co.,3"8 Scheidly attempted to have the
confirmation of an arbitration award overturned." 9 Scheidly claimed that the
arbitrators violated the U.A.A. by confirming that the arbitration award included the
damages for loss of consortium.32" The court did not address the merits of the case
finding that this suit was barred by res judicata 2'
B. Denial of Confirmation of an Arbitration Award
In Blount Excavating, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Tennessee, Inc.,322 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals was asked to review a case where the circuit court
refused to confirm an arbitration award.323 Denso Manufacturing Tennessee, Inc.
307. Id. at 316.
308. Id. at 318.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 319.
311. Id. at 318.
312. Id.
313. 1999 WL 977819.








322. 1999 WL 1068678 (Tenn. App. Nov. 29, 1999).
323. Id. at *1.
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
22
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2000, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2000/iss2/15
The Uniform Arbitration Act
("Denso") brought the original action to confirm the arbitration award rendered in
their favor.324 The trial court refused to confirm the award and Denso brought this
appeal.325 The appellate court found that they had limited review in this matter
looking for "clear error" by the trial court and accepting the trial courts
determination of facts unless they it is found to be "clearly erroneous."" 6 The
arbitration award was denied by the trial court because it was found that the
arbitrator was not a neutral third party in violation of Tennessee's Uniform
Arbitration Act.3 27 The arbitrator in question was an architect who was under the
employment of Denso 28 The court upheld the trial court's decision because the
arbitrator in the action was not impartial as required by the Tennessee Arbitration
Act.
329
VIII. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
There are several conditions in section 12 under which the court will vacate an
award upon application of a party.330
A. Evident Partiality by Neutral Arbitrator
Under section 12 an award shall be vacated where there is evident partiality by
a neutral arbitrator or corruption or misconduct by any arbitrator prejudicing the
rights of any party.33 Courts will not review the impartiality of arbitrators until after
an award has been issued.332
In Bohinick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,333 the insured
initiated arbitration under her underinsured motorist coverage.334 Bohinick
appointed an arbitrator, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ("State Farm")
appointed its arbitrator, and finally the neutral arbitrator was appointed around
February 1995."'5 Because the neutral arbitrator had failed to set an arbitration date,
on July 28, 1995, Bohinick requested the neutral's recusal.336 The first neutral
arbitrator recused himself and the second was not appointed until December 14,
1995. 311 Arbitration finally took place in December 1996, and on March 11, 1996,
Bohinick was awarded $270,000.338 Bohinick brought a breach of contract claim
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at *2.
327. Id. at *4. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-304 (1999).
328. Blount, 1999 WL 1068678 at *5.
329. Id. at *5 - 6.
330. U.A.A. § 12.
331. U.A.A. § 12(a)(2).
332. See Crim v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 326, 330 (D. Md. 1999).
333. No. CIV.A. 98-CV-2278, 1999 WL 238947 (D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1999).
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alleging that "State Farm postponed the arbitration proceedings through 'a secret ex
parte communication with the neutral arbitrator."'339 Finding the claim to be a
collateral attack on the arbitration award, the court applied the most nearly
applicable section of the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act regarding vacating
an award." ° The court dismissed the breach of contract claim holding that Bohinick
alleged misconduct, but did not allege that her rights were in any way prejudiced,
and the proper remedy would be to vacate rather than award damages.34'
B. Application for Vacatur of Award Within Ninety Days
A party must move for vacation of an award within ninety days from the
delivery of a copy of the award unless the condition is fraud, corruption, or undue
means.3 42 If this is the case, the application must be made within ninety days from
discovery of such grounds or ninety days from when it should have been
discovered.4  Time limits are strictly enforced by the courts. 3'  Where no
arbitration award exists under the U.A.A., these time restrictions are not
applicable. 4 '
In International Technologies Integration, Inc. v. Palestine Liberation
Organization,3 46 the district court denied the Palestinian National Authority's
("PNA") motion to vacate the award.347 International Technologies Integration, Inc.
("ITI") had initiated arbitration proceedings against PNA through the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") for breach of contract and served PNA with copies
of every submission to the arbitrator.348 PNA never responded and the arbitrator
conducted the proceeding ex parte, awarding damages to ITI on October 15, 1997.3 9
The award was filed on November 13, 1997, and delivered to PNA on November 26,
1997.3"0 PNA did not remove the action to the district court until March 24, 1998,
more than ninety days after delivery of the award.35" ' Pursuant to Rule 40 of the
AAA's Commercial Arbitration rules, ITI properly served notice on PNA and under
Virginia's arbitration act, PNA was time-barred from asserting any grounds for
vacating the award." 2
In Premier Private Security Inc. v. International Union, United Plant Guard
Workers of America; Local No. 796,35 Premier Private Security, Inc. ("Premier")
339. Id.
340. Id. at *2. See PA. CONS. STAT. § 7314 (1998).
341. Bohinick, 1999 WL 238947 at *2.
342. U.A.A. § 12(b).
343. Id.
344. Groves v. Groves, 704 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
345. Blount, 1999 WL 1068678 at '1, *5.
346. 66 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 1999).
347. Id. at 4. Palestinian National Authority is the political entity in which the Palestinian judicial,
legislative, and executive powers are reposed. Id. at 5.
348. Id. at 6-7.
349. Id. at 7-8.
350. Id. at 15.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 11, 14.
353. No. 98-6233, 1999 WL 218944 (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 1999).
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sought to vacate an arbitration award covering payment of fringe benefits in favor
of the union." 4 The initial award was entered on March 14, 1997, and Premier
received it on March 28, 1997. 3"' Premier filed a motion to vacate on July 3, 1997,
more than ninety days after the issuance and receipt of the initial award.35 6 The
union moved to dismiss contending that the motion to vacate was time-barred by the
Oklahoma U.A.A., but Premier contended the period was inapplicable without
arguing what period or statute should apply.357 The district court found that the
arbitration act's ninety-day period barred Premier's action and the circuit court
agreed.358
The ninety-day period is not tolled by filing a request with the arbitrator to
reconsider the award." 9 Indiana courts have held that the time period for filing a
motion to vacate begins to run from the date of the award, regardless of whether a
request for reconsideration is pending with the arbitrator." The court found that the
Indiana U.A.A. does not require a party to await an arbitrator's decision before
petitioning the trial court to vacate an award.16 ' This result furthers the purpose of
the U.A.A. to resolve disputes more efficiently and expeditiously than traditional
litigation.
62
C. Arbitrator Exceeding the Scope of Authority
Under section 12(a)(3), an award shall be vacated where the arbitrator exceeded
their powers.3 63
In Everen Securities, Inc. v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,364 former employees of
a securities frn, Carlson and Wright, moved to vacate the arbitration panel's award
of damages for breach of contract and misappropriating trade secrets.365 The motion
to vacate was denied and the defendants appealed, claiming "the NYSE arbitration
panel exceeded the scope of its authority by reopening and taking evidence on the
trade secret issue."" Since the trial court had determined in preliminary injunction
hearings that Everen's client names and addresses were not trade secrets, Carlson
and Wright claimed the panel's decision to revisit the trade secrets issue warranted
reversal.3 67 The court stated that "findings made as a result of a preliminary
injunction request are not final and do not bind the parties at subsequent stages of the
354. Id. at * 1.
355. Id. at *2.
356. Id.
357. Id. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 812.C (West 1993) (following ninety-day rule for application
for vacation of award).
358. Premier, 1999 WL 218944 at *4.
359. Groves, 704 N.E.2d at 1072.
360. Id. at 1076.
361. Id. at 1075.
362. Id. at 1076.
363. U.A.A. § 12(a)(3).
364. 719 N.E.2d 312.
365. Id. at 314.
366. Id. at 316-17.
367. Id. at 317.
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case" therefore, "... . the circuit court's holding was not binding upon the arbitration
panel's subsequent consideration of the matter."368
In D & E Construction Co. v. Denley,369 the trial court entered an order vacating
the entire arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrators had exceeded their
powers in awarding attorneys' fees to D&E Construction Co. ("D&E").3 7' D&E had
submitted a claim for arbitration, pursuant to agreement, following Denley's alleged
breach of a construction contract.371 Although D&E's claim did not originally
include attorneys' fees, the arbitration panel awarded $13,000 in fees to D&E.372
Under Tennessee law, "[t]he fact that the relief was such that it could not or would
not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating .. .the
award., 373 A trial court could be held in error for awarding attorneys' fees under this
scenario and the arbitration panel could have made an error of law, but the court
deemed it "insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. '374 The
court reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the other
issues raised by Denley's petition to vacate the award.375
In Ruggiero v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,3 7 6 the parties
agreed to arbitrate an underinsured motorist coverage claim. 377 On April 30, 1997,
the arbitrators notified the parties that they had reached a decision on all issues.378
On June 4, 1997, the award letter was issued stating that a majority of the arbitrators
found in favor of plaintiff Ruggiero and that the relevant figure for determining
applicability of underinsured motorist coverage "is the amount of actually available
tortfeasor coverage, rather than the maximum applicable tortfeasor coverage. 379
Unbeknownst to the parties and the arbitrators, a Delaware Supreme Court opinion
had reached exactly the opposite determination in an unreported opinion on May 16,
1997.3"0 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ("State Farm") sent the
opinion to the arbitrators on June 10, 1997, and the arbitrators treated it as a timely
motion for rehearing. 8 On September 10, 1997, the arbitrators withdrew the June
4 award in favor of Ruggiero and substituted a new award in favor of State Farm
based on the Delaware Supreme Court opinion.8 2
Ruggiero appealed seeking to vacate the award, claiming that the arbitrators'
exceeded their power and the U.A.A. grants the authority to vacate awards only to
the court.3 83 The court held that the arbitrators' authority to resolve the dispute
368. Id.
369. No. 02A01-9812-CH-00358, 1999 WL 685883 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1999).
370. Id. at *2.
371. Id. at *1.
372. Id.
373. Id. at *5 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313(a)(5) (Supp. 1997)).
374. Id. (quoting Turner v. Nicholson Properties, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 42, 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)).
375. Id. at *6.
376. No. 16075, 1999 WL 499459 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1999).
377. Id. at * 1.
378. Id. at *2.
379. Id. at *2-3.
380. Id. at *3.
381. Id.
382. Id. at *4.
383. Id. at *5.
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ended on April 30 and they exceeded their authority by entertaining State Farm's
letter as a post-hearing Rule 59 motion. 4
In Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Zielinski,38 investor Zielinski filed a claim for
arbitration with the National Association of Securities Dealers against a brokerage
firm and its employee/broker alleging various violations of securities exchange
laws.386 Zielinski requested reasonable attorney fees which the arbitration panel
awarded after "consider[ing] the arguments of the parties, as well as the Illinois
Securities Law of 1953... and determin[ing] that authority existed for an award of
attorney[s] fees to... [Zielinski]."" 7 The brokerage firm filed a petition to vacate
the portion of the award assessing attorney fees against them, alleging that the
arbitration panel exceeded their authority because none of the claims asserted by
Zielinksi permitted an award of attorney fees.388 The court stated that under Illinois
law, attorney fees may not be awarded unless specifically authorized by statute or
provided for in the contract between the parties. 3 9 Because no agreement to arbitrate
existed, none of the statutes relied upon by Zielinksi allowed for attorney fees, and
no reference was made in her claim to the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 which
authorizes such fees, the court held that the panel exceeded its authority in awarding
attorney fees.3' 9
The court in Nelson v. Livingston Rebuild Center, Inc.,'9' held that the district
court erred when it remanded the motion to vacate portions of the award regarding
extra living expenses and out-of-pocket losses for attorneys fees to the arbitrator.
3 92
Following the arbitrator's decision to award damages to a former employee under
the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, the employer moved the district
court to vacate parts of the decision.3 93 The district court remanded the decision to
the arbitrator who made an amended award. 94 The Supreme Court of Montana
found that the provision of the Montana U.A.A. permitting a district court to vacate
awards upon a finding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers was not a provision
under which an arbitrator could correct an award.3 93 Thus, the arbitrator was without
statutory authority to make substantive changes to the original award.
3 96
In Ryan v. Kontrick,3 97 an arbitration award from a breach of partnership
agreement provided for punitive damages and attorneys fees.3 98 The arbitration
agreement between the parties provided for reasonable attorneys fees, but not
punitive damages, and stated the agreement would be governed by Illinois law.399
384. Id. at *7-8.
385. 713 N.E.2d 739 (111. App. Ct. 1999)
386. Id. at 741. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13 (West 1999).
387. Quick, 713 N.E.2d at 741.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 744. See 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10 (West 1999).
390. Quick, 713 N.E.2d at 744.
391. 981 P.2d 1185 (Mont. 1999).
392. Id. at 1188.
393. Id. at 1185.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 1187.
396. Id.
397. 710 N.E.2d. 11, 13 (111. App. Ct. 1999).
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On appeal to vacate the award, Kontrick argued that the punitive damages award
exceeded the scope of the arbitrator's authority under the agreement.400 The
arbitrator had applied Commercial Arbitration Rules of the A.A.A., but the language
of the arbitration agreement specified that Illinois law governed.4 0 1 "Under Illinois
law, punitive damages may be awarded by an arbitrator only where there is an
express provision authorizing such relief in the arbitration agreement. ' '40 2 The court
vacated the punitive damages portion of the award because it exceeded the
arbitrator's authority under Illinois law and the terms of the agreement.40 3 Finding
the issue unreviewable, the court also denied Kontrick's claim that the award of
attorney's fees should be vacated because it lacked supporting evidence. 40
In another Illinois case regarding punitive damages, City of Chicago v. Water
Pipe Extension, Bureau of Engineering Laborers 'Local No. 1092,40' the city and the
union both filed petitions to vacate portions of the arbitrator's award. 40 6 The circuit
court denied both petitions and appeals were made by both parties.40 7 Arbitration
was initiated by the union over alleged violations of the collective bargaining
agreement and submitted to an arbitrator who had arbitrated fourteen prior shift
change grievances between the parties."° The arbitrator concluded that double time
was the overtime remedy for hours worked by water department employees outside
their normal shifts on the dates at issue based on his December 2, 1992, decision that
this would be the remedy for future violations.409 The arbitrator also ruled that the
sewer department did not violate the agreement by canceling shifts on the dates at
issue based on section 9.12 of the agreement.1 Since the case arose under the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, "the arbitration award must be enforced if the
arbitrator acts within the scope of his authority and his award draws its essence from
the [collective bargaining agreement].",4" The agreement did not provide for the
authority to impose punitive damages and the arbitrator's statements, coupled with
the fact that the double time relief exceeded the overtime pay in the agreement, led
the court to conclude the award was punitive. 2 The court reversed the double time
remedy for water department employees because the arbitrator exceeded his
authority.4 3 However, given the whole of the agreement and the plain language of
section 9.12, the court found that the part of the award regarding the sewer
department drew its essence from the agreement and affirmed the award.41 4
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 14 (quoting Edward Electronic Co. v. Automation, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 833 (i11. App. Ct.
1992)).
403. Id. at 16.
404. Id.
405. 707 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
406. Id. at 257.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 259.
409. Id. at 260.
410. Id. Section 9.12 (a) addressed departments which historically curtailed operations due to low
temperature but (b) specifically excludes Local 1092. Id. at 259.
411. Id. at 261.
412. Id. at 262-3.
413. Id. at 263-4.
414. Id. at 264.
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In McFerren v. B & B Investment Group,"' a dispute over fee ownership to real
estate was submitted to arbitration.416 The plaintiff, McFerren, sought to vacate the
award under Michigan law, which prohibited submission of any issue involving fee
ownership of real estate to arbitration.417 The appellate court vacated the judgment
of the trial court affiming the award because the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his
authority under Michigan law.4 8
In Vore v. Howell Construction Co., 41 9 the owner and contractor on a
construction project arbitrated disputes over payment and work stoppage and the
owner sought to vacate the award.42 ° The owner listed grounds for vacating the
award based on the theory that the arbitration panel had exceeded its powers. 421 The
court held that the arbitration panel did not exceed its powers because it did not
determine the rights and obligations of third parties and the owner's remaining
grounds for vacating the award were arguably based on the contract.
422
D. Contravening Public Policy
"Courts may refuse to enforce arbitration awards that contravene well defined
public policy ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interest. 4 23 In Everen, Carlson and
Wright argued that Everen succeeded in arbitration because four of the five
employees in a branch office left to take positions with A.G. Edwards, referring to
this as a "raid" theory of recovery.424 Because no reference was made to laws or
legal precedents endorsing such a "raid" theory, the court refused to overturn the
award.
425
E. Gross Errors of Law
Generally, arbitration awards will only be overturned for gross errors of fact or
law if those errors appear on the face of the award.42 6 In Everen, Carlson and Wright
also argued that the arbitration panel committed gross errors of law in awarding
damages by fizding breach of a fiduciary duty and presuming that Carlson and
Wright would have remained with Everen forever for the purposes of damages
calculations.427 Because the evidence showed Carlson had significant managerial
415. 233 Mich. App. 505 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
416. Id. at 508.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 513.
419. No. CIV.A. 98-2391-KHV, 1999 WL 156057 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 1999).
420. Id. at * 1.
421. Id. at *2.
422. Id. at *4.
423. Everen, 719 N.E.2d at 317.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 318.
427. Id. at 318-19.
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and supervisory responsibilities for the branch office and the lost profits were based
on a terminable year figure, the court affirmed the trial court's denial to vacate.428
F. No Arbitration Agreement Existed
An award shall be vacated where "[t]here was no arbitration agreement and the
issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did
not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. 429
In DMS Properties-First, Inc. v. P. W Scott Associates, Inc. ,43 an agreement was
entered into by Peder W. Scott, the president of Scott, and Dennis Salter.43 The
agreement contained no mention of DMS Properties-First, Inc. ("DMS") and was
never revised to substitute DMS for Salter.432 Pursuant to the agreement, DMS filed
a notice of intention to arbitrate against Scott that said unless Scott applied to enjoin
the arbitration within twenty days after service, Scott was thereafter barred from
objecting on grounds that a valid agreement was not made.433 Scott did not file a
motion to enjoin the arbitration and a year and a half later DMS filed a demand for
arbitration.434 Scott moved to dismiss the arbitration on the ground that there was no
arbitration agreement with DMS.4 ' The arbitration panel found insufficient
evidence of a binding agreement to arbitrate between Scott and DMS and issued an
award dismissing arbitration.436 DMS sought to vacate the award and the court
denied the motion under a deferential review where substantial evidence supported
the arbitrators' decision.437
IX. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD
The grounds established for the modification of an arbitral award under Section
13 of the U.A.A. are technical in nature.435 Specifically, the U.A.A. allows for court
action to modify an award if: (1) figures have been miscalculated or persons or
property incorrectly described, (2) the arbitrator awarded upon a matter not
submitted and that award can be corrected without affecting the merits, or (3) the
award is imperfect in form.439 Application for modification or correction must be
made within ninety days of receipt of the award and can be joined, in the alternative,
428. Id. at 319.
429. U.A.A. § 12(a)(5).
430. No. CIV.A.16450, 1999 WL 1261335 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1999).
431. Id. at *1.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at *2.
435. Id.
436. Id. at *3.
437. Id. at *6.
438. Ruggiero, 1999 WL 499459, at *4. Although the court in Ruggiero was referring to Delaware's
Uniform Arbitration Act in making this statement, the language of the Delaware Act is modeled after
that of the U.A.A. Id.
439. U.A.A. §13.
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with an application to vacate." The court can confirm the award as received or as
properly modified."'
A. Remand to the Arbitrator
An issue of remand is confronted in Office & Professional Employees
International Union, Local No. 471 v. Brownsville General Hospital." A hospital
employee was suspended after a sexual harassment complaint was received and
agreed to undergo counseling as a condition of reinstatement. However, a
breakdown in the counseling relationship occurred and resulted in termination of the
sessions."' Brownsville General Hospital terminated the employee and the
employee appealed. The matter was referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator found
that the hospital did not have the right to terminate the employee but could keep him
from returning to work until the counseling had been completed.4" The union then
filed a lawsuit seeking reinstatement on the grounds that the employee was in
substantial compliance and pled, in the alternative, for remand to the arbitrator for
clarification as to whether the completed counseling sessions had to be with the
originally assigned doctor." 5 The hospital appealed the district court's decision to
remand the matter to the arbitrator." 6 The district court held, and the Third Circuit
affirmed, that remand for clarification did not violate the doctrine of functus officio
as the hospital contended." 7
The doctrine of functus officio bars an arbitrator from revisiting the merits of
an award issued by an arbitrator on the theory that once an award is announced, the
arbitrator has exhausted all of his or her power."8 One of the exceptions to this
doctrine allows an arbitrator to revisit the decision "where the award, although
seemingly complete, leaves doubt as to whether the submission has been fully
executed, an ambiguity arises which the arbitrator is entitled to clarify."4 9 The third
circuit reasoned that determining whether the arbitrator intended the counseling to
be completed by the assigned therapist or any therapist is an issue that fits foursquare
within this exception. Thus, short of remand, the district court could only have
granted or denied reinstatement based on their perception of what the arbitrator
intended. Remand for clarification would leave no doubt and would be "more likely
to give the parties the award for which they bargained.,
450
Another decision supporting remand was Casias v. Dairyland Insurance Co.
45
'
In Casias, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. 186 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1999).
443. Id. at 328.
444. Id. at 329.
445. Id. at 330.
446. Id. at 331.
447. Id. Functus officio is Latin for "a task performed" Id.
448. Id. The basis for the doctrine is that arbitrators are not as insulated from outside influences as
judges. Id.
449. Id. (citing Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1991)).
450. Local No. 471, 186 F.3d at 333.
451. 975 P.2d 385 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
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confirming an arbitration award without clarification pertaining to the amount of the
award. s2 The parties agreed to arbitration to determine the amount of underinsured
motorist payment in dispute. The parties also agreed that the amount already
obtained by the tortfeasor would be used as an offset against the amount paid under
the underinsured motorist coverage as required by state law.453 When the insured
moved for confirmation of the award, the insurance company presented an affidavit
showing that the arbitrators had not considered the offset amounts and moved for
remand to the arbitrators for clarification. The court refused and confirmed the
award.45 Citing the New Mexico Arbitration Act,455 the court of appeals noted that
"review of arbitration awards cannot be based on questions of law or fact" but rather
are "generally limited to allegations of fraud, partiality, misconduct, excess of
powers or technical problems in execution of the award.' "6 Furthermore, "the scope
of matters to be decided is determined by the parties. 457 The arbitration agreement
that the parties entered into called for arbitration over any disagreement between
them.458 Since the parties agreed to the offset amount, this was a matter outside the
scope of the arbitration. 459 Therefore, the trial court should have confirmed the
award only after subtracting the offset amount or remanded to the arbitrators for
clarification.W
In Ruggiero v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,461 the arbitrators
impermissibly withdrew an award and offered a substitute award after a request for
reconsideration by the insurance company. After the arbitrator's final award, the
Supreme Court of Delaware decided a case contradicting the outcome. When the
insured moved to confirm the award, the insurance company, having learned of the
decision, requested reconsideration of the award and the arbitrators complied." 2 No
party contends that the arbitrators knew of the decision prior to announcing the
award."3 The Court of Chancery of Delaware, upon being asked to confirm this new
fimding, held that arbitrators may not modify what they intended to be a final award
"even where the final award results from an erroneous application of Delaware
law."46 As rationale for this holding the court cited § 13 of the Delaware Arbitration
Act 465 which allows "largely technical grounds" for modifying an award."6 In the
memorandum opinion, Judge Steele articulated the basis for holding the arbitrators
to the original decision in spite of the fact that it would be in contradiction of
Delaware law.
452. Id. at 386.
453. Id. at 388.
454. Id.
455. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7 (Michie 1978).
456. Casias, 975 P.2d at 388.
457. Id. at 390.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 391.
461. 1999 WL 499459.
462. Id. at *3.
463. Id.
464. Id. at *1.
465. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10 § 5701.
466. Ruggiero, 1999 WL 499459 at *4.
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I recognize that my efforts to keep arbitration a streamlined, efficient
alternative dispute resolution mechanism results in the anomaly that this
Court must sanction reinstatement of an award subsuming a ruling
contrary to Delaware law. It is far more important, however, to support
and even encourage the strong public policy of limiting arbitration
procedure and practice to an efficient, effective streamlined process rather
than endorse the commitment of parties' resources to motion practice,
which would defeat the commendable goal of providing a truly viable
alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
67
In Nelson v. Livingston Rebuild Center, Inc. 468 a wrongful discharge action in
Montana, the district court remanded an arbitration award back to the arbitrator and
confirmed the award as amended by the arbitrator. 469 The Supreme Court of
Montana held that the district court was without statutory authority to remand the
award.4 70 After an arbitrator awarded plaintiff, Nelson, $94,569 for wrongful
discharge the defendant, Livingston Rebuild Center, Inc. ("LRC") moved to vacate
a portion of the award. 7' The district court did not decide the issue but reappointed
the arbitrator to do so and the arbitrator reduced the award by more than $66,000.472
This reappointment was based on LRC's claim that the arbitrator "exceeded his
powers" in the original award by awarding for items not covered in state law.473
Citing the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act ("MUAA"), 474 the supreme court noted
that the only statutory grounds for a court to order modification of an award by the
arbitrator are for miscalculations, mistakes, imperfection of form or clarification.47"
The part of the award vacated was substantive, not technical, therefore exceeding the
plain language of the MIUAA.476  The court did not squarely answer LRC's
contention that the MUAA and the WDFEA were in conflict and that the WDFEA
prohibited the type of damages originally awarded but answered that "the fact that
damages might not have been awarded in a court of law is not grounds for vacating
the award." 477 Comparing court review of an arbitration to judicial review of an
appellate court, the supreme court stated, "Courts do not sit to hear claims of factual
and legal error by an arbitrator .... If courts were free to intervene on these
grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances by private mechanisms would be
greatly undermined. 478
467. Id. at *7.
468. 981 P.2d 1185.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 1186.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 1187. Specifically the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act ("WDFEA"). Id.
474. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5 (1999).
475. Nelson, 981 P.2d at 1187.
476. Id.
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B. Interest
Idaho and Illinois courts recently considered questions of modifications of
awards involving interest. In Schilling v. Allstate Insurance Co.,4 79 an arbitration
panel believed they lacked jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest or attorney's
fees and expressly declined to do so. 48° The district court modified the award and
awarded prejudgment interest and Allstate appealed asserting that the district court
erred in doing so."" The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the district court's action
was proper as the lack of prejudgment interest was a "miscalculation," and the Idaho
statute allowed for correction of a miscalculation.482
In Pekin Insurance Co. v. Benson,483 the circuit court found that defendant-
appellee, Benson, was entitled to underinsured motorist's coverage but granted
plaintiffs request to stay the arbitration required by the insurance contract pending
appeal of the Court's decision.8 4 As a conditiori of the stay, the court imposed an
award of prejudgment interest on any ensuing arbitral award.485 Plaintiff accepted
the stay order but appealed the assigned interest. 4 6 The Appellate Court of Illinois,
under the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act,487 found that a stay is not a final order
resolving the rights of the parties and, thus, not appealable.48 ' Additionally, plaintiff
could not appeal the imposition of prejudgment interest alone as it and the stay order
were a single, interlocutory appeal.489 The court further argued that, even if
jurisdiction existed to review the interest imposition separate from the stay order,




C. The Essence Test
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided two cases in 1999 applying the
"essence" test to review an arbitration decision. Under the "essence" test, "an
arbitration award must derive its 'essence' from the collective bargaining agreement
to pass judicial review. 49' In January of 1999, the court invalidated an arbitration
decision interpreting a collective bargaining agreement where such an agreement
incorporated elements of state law and the arbitrator's decision was contrary to that
479. 980 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1999).
480. Id. at 1015. Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees was later dropped. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1018. The Idaho U.A.A. 7-913 is virtually identical to the U.A.A. in its description of
when a modification will be allowed. In dissent, Chief Justice Trout argued that the arbitrators' belief
that they did not have jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest was a mistake of law, not a
miscalculation, and the district court was without power to correct that mistake. Id.
483. 714 N.E.2d 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
484. Id. at 562.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-5/23 (West 1996).
488. Pekin Ins. Co., 714 N.E.2d at 567.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 568.
491. Mifflinburg Area Educ. Ass'n v. Mifflinburg Area Sch. Dist., 724 A.2d 339, 342 (Pa. 1999).
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law.492 Under the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act,493 "a court in reviewing an
arbitration award ... shall ... modify or correct the award where the award is
contrary to law... ."94 "The 'essence' test remains the standard of judicial review
for arbitration awards which are subject to section 7302(d)(2) of the U.A.A.,,495 The
court applied and clarified this standard in December of 1999 in State System Of
Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College University Professional
Ass 'n (PSEA-NEA).496 The court declared that the "essence" standard will be used
in analyzing arbitration awards involving collective bargaining agreements under the
U.A.A. and, as such, the court will conduct a two-part analysis. "First, the court shall
determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement ... the
arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can rationally be
derived from the collective bargaining agreement. ,49 This is a standard of great
deference.498
D. Time Limit
The U.A.A. allows for application to the court to modify or correct an award
within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant. 499 In
Groves v. Groves,' °° a dispute over modification of child support was submitted to
arbitration."' ° After the arbitrator's decision was released, Mrs. Groves filed a timely
request for reconsideration by the arbitrator based on her belief that Mr. Groves had
submitted false information to the arbitrator. 50 2 The arbitrator refused to reconsider
without the consent of both parties and Mr. Groves did not consent.0 3 Mrs. Groves
then filed a Motion for Modification or Correction of the Award but her filing was
more than ninety days after notice." Mrs. Groves argued that the motion was filed
within ninety days of her notification that the arbitrator would not reconsider and
that the time should have been tolled while awaiting this decision. 55 The court of
appeals, applying the Indiana Arbitration Act,5°6 which is based on the U.A.A., found
that there was no requirement for Mrs. Groves to wait for the arbitrator to announce
492. Id. at 343.
493. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301-7320 (West 1998).
494. Id. § 7302(d)(2).
495. Mifflinburg 724 A.2d at 344 n.6. See County of Centre v. Musser, 548 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Pa.
1988); Austin Area Educ. Ass'n v. Austin Area Sch. Dist., 159 Pa. Commw. Ct. 640, 644 n.6 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993).
496. 743 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1999).
497. Id. at 413.
498. Id.
499. U.A.A. § 13(a).
500. 704 N.E.2d 1072.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 1073.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. The court acknowledges that at least one state has held that the time limit should be tolled
until the arbitrator has ruled on a request for reconsideration based on due process and judicial economy
concerns. Id. at 1074.
506. IND. CODE § 34-57 (Michie 1998).
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a decision to reconsider before filing the motion for modification; these can be done
at the same time. °7 In addition, the Indiana U.A.A. has a provision tolling the
ninety-day limit for accusations of fraud.5"' Given this, the court reasoned that the
legislature would have spoken specifically any time it intended the time period be
tolled. °9 The court also noted that, since the purpose of the U.A.A. is to "provide
a more efficient, expeditious manner in which to resolve disputes," time limits have
been strictly enforced."'
X. SECTION 14: JUDGMENT OR DECREE ON AWARD
"Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award,
judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any
other judgment or decree. Costs of the application and of the proceedings
subsequent thereto, and disbursements may be awarded by the court. 51 '
In two similar cases, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary
judgment to State Farm when arbitration awards, confirmed and rendered, were
challenged collaterally.' 1 2 Neither plaintiff appealed the arbitration award, but
attacked the award collaterally by seeking damages for breach of contract.5 " The
court held, in both cases, that the strong public policy valuing arbitration as an
"expeditious and inexpensive method of resolving disputes" precluded this type of
collateral attack 51 4 and the appropriate relief for alleged misconduct during
arbitration under the Pennsylvania version of the U.A.A.515 would have been to have
the award vacated, not seek damages.516
In Vandenberg v. Superior Court,1 7 the Supreme Court of California held that
"a private arbitration award, even if judicially confirmed, may not have nonmutual
collateral estoppel effect under California law unless there was an express agreement
to that effect in the particular case." s"' In so holding, the court cautioned that the
result was to be applied narrowly and not be applied to any strict res judicata issue.519
In Vandenberg, the court of appeals found that "a party to a private arbitration is not
barred from relitigating issues decided by the arbitrator when those issues arise in a
different case involving a different adversary and different causes of action."52 The
507. Groves, 704 N.E.2d. at 1075.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 1076. The Court also includes an appeal to the legislature to act in clarification if this
decision is contrary to their intention. Id.
511. U.A.A.§ 14.
512. Bohinick, 1999 WL 238947 at * 1 & McCabe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d
666 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
513. McCabe, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 673 & Bohinick, 1999 WL 238947 at *2.
514. McCabe, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
515. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301-7320 (West 2000).
516. Bohinick 1999 WL 238947 at *2.
517. 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999).
518. Id. at 234.
519. Id. At 234 n.2.
520. Id. at 236.
Vol. 2000, No. 2
36
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2000, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2000/iss2/15
The Uniform Arbitration Act
court of appeals reasoned that private arbitration lacks many of the safeguards
associated with litigation in a court.52'
In this action, the insured sued commercial general liability insurers on various
causes of action including failure to settle and/or indemnify as to the underlying
claim 22  In affirming the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court of
California argued that the fairness of the application of collateral estoppel to future
claims depends, to some extent, on the "judicial nature" of the prior forum.52
Further, since the purpose of collateral estoppel is to protect the integrity of the
courts, that purpose is mooted by a private arbitration.5 24 By insisting on an express
agreement between the parties that the doctrine of collateral estoppel be binding, the
court deferred to the contractual nature of an agreement to arbitrate. 525 The court
concluded that it is counterintuitive to assume the parties meant for the doctrine to
apply, absent an express agreement to the contrary, based on the traditionally limited
role of the courts in arbitration and the parties' obvious desire to invoke that role.526
Finally, the court rejected the argument that, since California law gives confirmed
arbitration awards the force and effect of civil judgment, nonmutual collateral
estoppel is appropriate because fairness is always a component in invoking collateral
estoppel.527
XI. SECTION 15: JUDGMENT ROLL, DOCKETING
In Judith v. Graphic Communications International Union,52 s the primary issue
was one of appeal and will be discussed under the analysis in that section. 29
Docketing, however is mentioned by the court and deserves a note. In this sexual
harassment suit, the trial court gave an oral ruling on defendant's Motion for
Dismissal of Action and Referral to Arbitration that it was dismissing the case "in
favor of arbitration. 5 30  "No written order or docketing of a judgment ever
followed."53' The issue in this case became whether that order was final for purposes
of appeal. The court noted that the lack of docketing "presents another potentially
significant bar to finality." '532 Many courts are similarly confronted with the issue of
finality in the appeal of an arbitration award.
5 3
521. Id.
522. Id. at 229.
523. Id. at 237.
524. Id. at 240.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 239-40.
527. Id. at 241. Justice Brown, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, argues that the California
provision giving civil judgment weight to confirmed awards is "clear and unambiguous," and may permit
collateral estoppel with or without an express agreement. Id. at 246.
528. 727 A.2d 890 (D.C. 1999).
529. See discussion infra of U.A.A. § 19.
530. Judith, 727 A.2d at 891.
531. Id. at 891 n.2.
532. Id.
533. See discussion infra of U.A.A. § 19.
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XII. SECTION 17: JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Once a valid arbitration agreement is formed under section one of the U.A.A.,
any court of competent jurisdiction of the state has the power to enforce and enter
judgment on an award under the agreement. 34
A. Enforcing the Arbitration Agreement
In Dahl v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,"' the parties agreed to arbitrate Dahl's wrongful
discharge claim.53 6 Before the hearing date, employer Fred Meyer, Inc. moved to
dismiss arbitration because the complaint alleged a motive for discharge and
intended to state a cause of action under Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").53 The arbitrator dismissed finding that ERISA required exclusive
federal court jurisdiction.5 3' Dahl moved to amend his complaint to delete the
portion that involved ERISA, but the district court denied leave to amend and
confirmed the arbitrator's decision, dismissing Dahl's complaint with prejudice. 539
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana found that Dahl "failed to object to the
arbitrator's decision either before the arbitrator, or before the district court" and once
the parties agreed to arbitration the district court was without jurisdiction to allow
Dahl to amend his complaint.?' The court stated that "once the parties agree to
arbitration, the district court has authority only to confirm, modify and confirm, or
vacate and remand for rehearing. 54'
Vanderheyden v. Ajay, Inc.542 involved a contractual dispute over the
construction of a movie theater.5 3 The contract contained an arbitration clause, but
when the owner terminated the contract before the construction was completed, the
contractor filed suit pursuant to Tennessee law which permits "any remedy in a court
of proper jurisdiction."" The trial court stayed the proceedings and ordered the
parties to arbitrate as stipulated in the contract, but granted the contractor's
interlocutory appeal. 45 Finding the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act- " to be a
general statute, the court of appeals determined that Tennessee Code Annotated §
66-11-144(h) specifically applied to this situation and therefore the trial court erred
in ordering arbitration.547
534. U.A.A. § 17.
535. Dahl v. Meyer, Inc., 993 P.2d 6.
536. Id. at 7.
537. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1191 (1994).
538. Dahl, 993 P.2d at 7.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 7-8.
541. Id. at 8.
542. No. 02A01-9803-CH-00070, 1999 WL 562716 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1999).
543. Id. at *1.
544. Id. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-11-144 (covering contracts for the improvement of real property
specifically).
545. Vanderheyden, 1999 WL 562716, at *2.
546. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (Supp. 1998) (providing that any agreement between parties to
submit disputes to arbitration is binding and enforceable, and courts are granted jurisdiction to enforce
arbitration awards).
547. Vanderheyden, 1999 WL 562716, at *4-5.
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In another contractor case, Polytech School District v. JA. Moore & Sons,
Inc.,58 the parties' agreement contained the procedures for handling disputes.m9 The
agreement provided that "[t]he Owner shall, in its sole discretion, elect whether the
Contractor's claim shall proceed by way of arbitration or litigation" and "[i]f the
Owner does not give the Contractor timely notice of election, then the Contractor
shall be required to have such claim determined by litigation."" Finding the
contractor to have no contractual authority to demand arbitration, the court enjoined
arbitration and concluded the owner's "three-and-one-half-month delay in raising the
jurisdictional issue [was] reasonable in light of the parties' efforts at negotiating an
informal settlement of their differences.'
In Parr v. Tower Management Co.," the trial court granted a joint motion by
the parties to arbitrate." 3 After the arbitrator made the award to the plaintiffs and the
defendants had paid it, two of the plaintiffs fired their attorney and appealed the
arbitration pro se, seeking to disavow it.5m The appellate court noted that the U.A.A.
grants only a narrow standard of review and without a verbatim transcript of the
arbitration proceedings, the trial court was not in a position to review the award.555
The court affirmed the trial court's decision to uphold the award, finding that the pro
se plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration because their voluntary participation
ratified the unauthorized conduct of their attorney in agreeing to arbitration. 5m
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Global Industrial Technologies, Inc.,50 the parties
had agreed to arbitrate disputes according to the F.A.A.5" Dresser Industries, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation, sought to enjoin the arbitration contending that most of the
claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the remaining claim was not
ripe.559 Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the F.A.A. allows arbitrators to
rule on whether claims were time-barred and ripe.56' The court found that although
the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act was inapplicable, it did not divest the court
of traditional equity jurisdiction. 6'
Following the Nash test,562 the court found it unlikely that where the parties
agreed to arbitrate the subject of the underlying dispute they intended for other
548. No. Civ.Al400-K, 1999 WL 504780 (Del. Ch. July 8, 1999).
549. Id. at *1.
550. Id.
551. Id. at *3.
552. No. 01A01-981 1-CV-00573, 1999 WL 415169 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 1999).
553. Id. at *1.
554. Id. at *2-3.
555. ld. at *7.
556. Id.
557. No. Civ.A.16967, 1999 WL 413401 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1999).
558. Id. at *1.
559. Id.
560. Id. at * 1.
561. Id. at *3-4. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5702(a) (1999) (conferring jurisdiction only when the
parties' agreement provides for arbitration in the state). The agreement in question provided for
arbitration in Texas. Id. at *3.
562. See Nash v. Dayton Superior Corp., 728 A.2d 59 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating that the test requires
(1) the threshold question of whether the dispute, on the face of the arbitration clause, is subject to
arbitration and (2) the ultimate question of whether a legal remedy is available and fully adequate). Id.
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related issues to affect the "arbitrability. '563 Under the second prong of the Nash
test, the court found that Dresser would have the opportunity to raise the defenses
in arbitration and have judicial review of the decision.' 64 Therefore, an adequate
legal remedy existed for Dresser and his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
were dismissed.1
65
In Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari,66 the parties undertook a joint
venture to create and market a water-based maskant and created a limited liability
corporation ("LLC"), Malek LLC, in Delaware.567 The LLC agreement provided that
all disputes would be submitted to arbitration in California.5 6' Elf Atochem North
America, Inc. ("Elf") later brought suit for equitable remedies in the Delaware Court
of Chancery, but the court found the aforementioned agreement governed the
question of jurisdiction and granted Jaffari's motion to dismiss.5 69 On appeal, Elf
argued that the derivative claims it brought on behalf of Malek LLC were not
governed by the arbitration and forum selection clauses of the agreement because
Malek LLC was not a party to the agreement.570
The court stated that the LLC is simply the joint business vehicle of the
members and the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act ("Act") was designed
to permit maximum flexibility in entering into agreements to govern the parties'
relationship. 7 ' The court also stated that Elf had contracted away its right to bring
a derivative action in Delaware by the terms of the limited liability agreement.
5 72
The policy of the Act is to give maximum effect to the freedom of contract and
enforceability of LLC agreements and the court found no reason that the parties
could not contract to alter default jurisdictional provisions of Delaware law.5 73 The
court subsequently affirmed dismissal of Elf s complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.574
XIII. SECTION 18: VENUE
The venue section of the U.A.A. calls for the initial application to be made in
the county specified by the agreement, or if a hearing has already been held, the
county where that hearing took place. Otherwise, venue is found in the county
where the adverse party resides or has a business unless there is not a residence or
place of business in the state, then any county."5 In Knaffi v. Douglas Co.,576 the
563. Dresser, 1999 WL 413401, at *6.
564. Id.
565. Id. at *6-7.
566. 727 A.2d 286.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 288.
569. Id. at 289.
570. Id. at 293.
571. Id. The Act is codified in Chapter 18 of Title 6 of the Delaware Code.
572. Id. at 294.
573. Id. at 295. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1999).
574. Elf, 727 A.2d at 296.
575. U.A.A. §18.
576. 1999 WL 894203, at*].
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venue provision in the contract specified venue in Lucas County, Ohio, in violation
of Tennessee law which prohibited any venue invoking the laws of another state.577
The court of appeals found that the legislature had "embraced a policy favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements" by adopting the U.A.A. 78 and found
authority under that statute and state contractual law to sever the venue clause from
the rest of the arbitration agreement, thus "resolving any doubts in favor of
arbitration. ,79
XIV. SECTION 19: APPEALS
Section 19 reads:
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made
under Section 2;
(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under
Section 2(b);
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this
act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as
from orders or judgments in a civil action.580
A. Finality and Interlocutory Appeals
In Colorado School District's Self Insurance Pool v. J.P. Meyer Trucking &
Construction, Inc.,"' the school district's self insurance pool sought to recover
amounts paid for personal injury to people injured in an accident with defendant."2
The defendant moved to dismiss claiming the court lacked jurisdiction since the
matter was subject to mandatory arbitration." 3 The trial court denied defendant's
motion but did not make the order final under applicable state rules and the
defendants appealed the denial of their Motion to Dismiss.5" Colorado School
District's Self Insurance Pool contends that the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction
since the trial court's order was never final.5"5 Under Colorado law, interlocutory
577. Id. at *3.
578. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 - 29-5-318 (Supp.1995).
579. Knaffl, 1999 WL 894203, at *4.
580. U.A.A. §19.
581. 996 P.2d 257 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).






Griffin et al.: Griffin: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
orders are not appealable unless there is a specific statutory provision. 516 Here, that
statute is the Uniform Arbitration Act and it authorizes an interlocutory appeal from
"an order denying an application to compel arbitration.""8 7 In this case, the court
found that the "[t]rial court's denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss was equivalent
to the denial of a motion to compel arbitration" which gave the court of appeals
jurisdiction.'" 8
Pennsylvania law requires that, for an agreement to arbitrate to be covered by
the Uniform Arbitration Act,58 9 it must be in writing and expressly invoke the act.59°
Interlocutory orders are not appealable unless a specific statutory provision allows
for it and the U.A.A. allows for appeal to be taken from a "court order denying an
application to compel arbitration."5 91 In Midomo Co. Inc., the interlocutory appeal
was in the form of a preliminary objection requesting the court to verify an
arbitration agreement existed.5 92 The court, however, refused to "exalt form over
substance" and claimed jurisdiction for the appeal by holding that the order denying
the preliminary objection was the equivalent of one denying the motion to compel
arbitration.5 93 In Lowther v. Roxborough Memorial Hospital,594 however, the
superior court refused to apply the U.A.A. because it was not expressly stated in the
agreement to arbitrate.595 The court explained that, absent an express agreement to
use the U.A.A., common law principals as reflected in a separate statutory provision
apply.
596
Two Missouri cases present a somewhat inconsistent synthesis of state law and
the U.A.A. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 74.01(b) allows the court to enter
judgment "as to one or more parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay. 5 97 Further, Missouri's Uniform Arbitration Act allows
for appeal from "an order denying application to compel arbitration" but all appeals
must be taken "as from orders or judgments in a civil case." 59 In a civil case, "for
a judgment to be final and appealable it must dispose of all issues and parties in the
case."'5 99 Given these parameters, the southern district, in Garwood v. Port
Arrowhead Marina, Inc.,6° found that an appeal from the trial court's order denying
a Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration was not appealable because
the trial court did not expressly find that "there is no just reason for delay."6'' The
eastern district, however, found a motion to dismiss raised the arbitration question
and could be treated as a motion to compel, making the denial of that motion
586. Id.
587. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-221(1)(a) (West 1999).
588. Colo. Sch. Dist., 996 P.2d at 259.
589. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §7301-7320.
590. Midomo,. 739 A.2d at 183.
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 184.
594. 738 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
595. Id. at 483-85.
596. Id. at 483-84.
597. MO. SUP. CT. RULES. (1998).
598. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.440 (1994).
599. MO. SUP. CT. RULE 74.01(b).
600. 996 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
601. Id. at 155.
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appealable."2 The eastern district found that it was unnecessary for the trial court
to expressly find that "there is no just reason for delay" because the U.A.A.
preempted any state law that serves as an additional barrier to arbitration. 6°3
Bridgestone/Firestone v. McQueen6 concerned a suit for wrongful termination.
The employer filed a Motion to Stay Litigation and Compel Arbitration under an
Employee Dispute Resolution Plan.60 5 The trial court denied the motion and held
that the plan was a contract of adhesion not supported by adequate consideration.
606
The employer appealed and, invoking the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act,607
argued that the act specifically allowed for appeal from a denial of a motion to
compel arbitration." 8 The employee noted that the act specifically exempted
employment agreements and the court agreed, dismissing the appeal.609
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a trial
court's granting of defendant's Motion for Dismissal of Action and Referral to
Arbitration in Judith v. Graphic Communications International Union.610 The court
reasoned that, "while a denial of arbitration is appealable, an order to compel
arbitration is not.",611 The court continued by pointing out that, had the trial court
simply stayed the litigation, appeal would have been improper.61 2  The court
concluded "a number of courts have treated rulings for dismissal in favor of
arbitration as if they were orders to stay litigation. Such a result avoids elevating
form over substance and promotes... proarbitration purposes.' '6"3
B. The Scope of Review
In Knarr v. Erie Insurance Exchchange,6"4 after an accident with an uninsured
motorist, appellant commenced action against Erie Insurance Exchange ("Erie") that
proceeded to arbitration." 5 The arbitrators awarded a total of $110,305.00 but
reduced it to $51,617.80 after deducting anticipated social security benefits.61 6 Both
parties moved to vacate and/or modify and the trial court held that the disability
benefits had been improperly subtracted. 61 '7  Erie appealed the trial court's
reinstatement of the original award to the superior court, which reversed the trial
court on the grounds that it had improperly used the Arbitration Act of 1927 and not
602. Mueller, 5 S.W.3d at 186.
603. Id. at 188.
604. 3 S.W.3d 366 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
605. Id. at 366-67.
606. Id. at 366.
607. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.010 - 417.240 (Michie 1992).
608. Bridgestone/Firestone, 3 S.W.3d at 367.
609. Id.
610. Judith, 727 A.2d at 890.
611. Id. at 891.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 892.
614. 723 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1999).





Griffin et al.: Griffin: Recent Developments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the 1980 Act.6 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the superior court
erred by raising the issue sua sponte.6 19 Erie had not raised the issue of the 1980 Act
at either the trial or appellate level and thus, waived its right to do so. 620 Therefore,
on the theory of waiver or improper resurrection of the issue, the order of the trial
court was reinstated. 621 Similarly, in Knaffi v. Douglas Co., 622 failure to raise the
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act at the trial court constituted a waiver of
the ability to invoke those rules on appeal.623
In another case, after completion of arbitration and the deposit of awards,
plaintiff, dissatisfied with her award, fired her attorney and sought to disavow the
arbitration.6 4 Tennessee operates under the Uniform Arbitration Act that governs
the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. 626 This standard is narrow and
it is well established that the courts serve a limited role in review of arbitration.6 "
In this case, the parties willingly participated in the arbitration and made no
complaint about the process. 62 The court of appeals found that, without a complete
arbitral or trial court transcript, there was no record upon which to exercise their
limited scope of review.629 In addition, parties "cannot acquiesce and indeed fully
participate in the arbitration and then, disappointed with the outcome, disavow the
action of their attorney and agent.,
630
XV. SECTION 21: UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION
Section 21 of the U.A.A. is meant to assure that the states that adopt the U.A.A.
all interpret it in the same way.63' In Bridgestone/Firestone v. McQueen,632 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a circuit court's decision basing their reasoning
on the fact that the U.A.A. is to be interpreted the same between the states that have
enacted it.633 McQueen brought suit against Bridgestone/Firestone ("Firestone")
alleging wrongful discharge.634 Firestone made a motion to compel arbitration, but
618. Id. Pursuant to the 1927 Act a trial court could modify or correct an award where, among other
things, the award is "contrary to law." Id. The 1980 Act eliminated this language. Id.
619. Id. at 666.
620. Id. at 665.
621. Id. at 666.
622. Knaffl, 1999 WL 894203, at *2.
623. Id.
624. Parr, 1999 WL 415169, at * 1,*2. After Plaintiff Parr fired her attorney, she represented herself
during the rest of the proceeding, creating voluminous paperwork attacking the actions of her former
attorney. Id.
625. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 - 29-5-318 (Supp. 1995).
626. Parr, 1999 WL 415169, at *3 (citing Int'l Talent Group, Inc. v. Copyright Mgmt., Inc., 769
S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)).
627. Id.
628. Id. at *4.
629. Id. at *6.
630. Id. at *4.
631. U.A.A.§ 21
632. 3 S.W.3d 366.
633. Id. at 367 n.3.
634. Id. at 366.
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The Uniform Arbitration Act
the trial court denied it.635 Firestone then sought this appeal which McQueen
opposed reasoning that the trial court order was interlocutory and unappealable.636
The appellate court dismissed the appeal citing J&K Cement Construction, Inc. v.
Montalbano Builders, Inc. 637 and Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.68 and invoking U.A.A. section 21 which requires the court to follow
other states interpretations of the U.A.A.639
XVI. SECTION 25: TIME OF TAKING EFFECT
Section 25 of the U.A.A. covers when the act takes effect. 640 In Millennium
Solutions, Inc. v. Davis,641 the issue in front of the court was when a provision of the
U.A.A. adopted by Nebraska took effect. 642 The Supreme Court of Nebraska
interpreted this issue based upon normal statutory interpretation." 3 The court first
looked at the intent of legislature in enacting the statute. 6" The court determined this
statute represented a substantive change to the law and, "unless the Legislature has
clearly expressed an intention that the new statute is to be applied retroactively,"
then the statute is only to be applied prospectively. 64' The statute in question did not
express an intention to be applied retroactively so the court determined that the






636. Id. at 367.
637. 456 N.E.2d 889 (III. App. Ct. 1983).
638. 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988).
639. Bridgestone/Firestone, 3 S.W.3d at 367-68.
640. U.A.A. § 25.
641. 603 N.W.2d 406 (Neb. 1999).
642. Id. at 409.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 409-10.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 410-11.
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THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SCHOOL OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA
The Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution was established in 1984. Its
principal mission is to teach law students and lawyers comprehensive, efficient and
fair methods for managing and resolving disputes. Accordingly, the Center fosters
new approaches to lawyering and encourages and assists non-lawyers in the
appropriate use of alternative methods of dispute resolution such as mediation,
principled negotiation, arbitration, fact-finding and preventive lawyering. The Center
concentrates its efforts in three areas:
+ Innovations in law school education;
+ Continuing education for lawyers; and
+ Research & Publications
Innovations in Law School Education
Since its inception, the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution has been a
national leader in developing law school curricula dealing with this rapidly
developing area of law. The keystone of this focus on legal education is an award-
winning, innovative project in which dispute resolution instruction is integrated into
all first-year courses.
The Center also provides many learning opportunities for upper level students.
In recent years, course offerings include a survey course in dispute resolution and
courses in mediation, negotiation, arbitration and international dispute resolution.
Second and third year students also are eligible to enroll in a mediation clinic or
serve on the editorial board of the Journal of Dispute Resolution.
The University of Missouri School of Law also offers a Master of Laws (LL.M.)
program in Dispute Resolution. This program -- the first of its kind in the nation --
provides practitioners and scholars an opportunity for serious study of dispute
resolution beyond the juris doctor degree.
For its efforts and accomplishments, the Center for the Study of Dispute
Resolution was ranked first in the nation in US. News and World Report's 1999 and
2000 surveys of "America's Best Graduate Schools" In January 1999, the Center
also received the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution's Outstanding Practical
Achievement Award for its pioneering work in curriculum development.
Rather than resting on these laurels, the Center strives to remain on the cutting
edge. In July 1999, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation awarded the Center
a three-year $250,000 grant to extend its dispute resolution work in curriculum
development and legal education. The grant supports projects to broaden and
improve law school teaching in more advanced courses through support of LL.M.
student and faculty research and broad-based interdisciplinary partnerships.
Activities include creating new courses, developing empirical data on the use of
dispute resolution by practicing lawyers and new interdisciplinary initiatives
between the Center and the MU School of Journalism and the MU Center for the
Study of Organizational Change.
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